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A REGULATORY BACK DOOR: GENERAL
PROHIBITION TEN AND AMERICA’S
NATIONAL SECURITY
By Vilas Ramachandran*
Abstract
American leadership in innovation requires, among other things, an export control
regime that adapts to the realities of trade in the twenty-first century. The United
States understands that the importance of American leadership in innovation
reaches far beyond a theoretical debate about American hegemony; it has
implications for the national security of the United States. However, Section
736.2(b)(10) of the Export Administration Regulations, known as General
Prohibition Ten, creates vulnerabilities that jeopardize the national security of the
United States while also adding unnecessary costs to American exporters.
General Prohibition Ten makes it impossible for an American exporter to take
control of an export once a violation of the Export Administration Regulations has
occurred or is about to occur, which threatens American national security. In
particular, the regulation reduces American “lead time” in innovation, fails to
adapt to new classes of exports and threats, and fails to consider the economic
impact of General Prohibition Ten. This article argues that General Prohibition
Ten does not comply with Congressional intent and that the Department of
Commerce should immediately reform the regulation.

* University of Virginia School of Law, J.D., 2021. Associate at Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders
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INTRODUCTION
The end of World War II brought about unprecedented international
stability, which spurred economic growth both in the United States and in nations
around the world.1 Investors began to move capital across the globe, and in the past
few decades, international trade has increased drastically. 2 Recognizing the
importance of the rule of law in trade, Congress enacted a series of laws meant to
encourage trade and globalization while discouraging bad faith behavior on the part
of exporters.3 The United States understood that its leadership in innovation is a
national security interest and that it was important for the nation to use its power to
protect its intellectual property.4 Protecting American innovation has been a clear
priority of Congress over the last fifty years and garners sweeping bipartisan
support.5
However, for decades, foreign nation-states have been attempting to gain
an edge on American innovation through intellectual property (“IP”) theft in that
nation or through American supply chain vulnerabilities. Such attempts at stealing
IP have been successful numerous times.6 For example, in 2018, a federal grand
jury indicted a state-owned enterprise of the People’s Republic of China, and
others, for crimes related to stealing trade secrets of an American semiconductor
company for the benefit of the Chinese government. 7 Like other IP being stolen,
Semiconductors are vital for “military and defense technology, weaponry, and
equipment; broader geopolitically significant technologies, such as Artificial
Intelligence (AI) and Quantum Computing; and the critical infrastructure and
services upon which the daily functioning of societies rest, such as 5G networks.” 8
IP theft is a growing problem, and its threat to the United States extends far past a
theoretical debate about American hegemony. 9 Stolen IP can have a real and lasting
1

Charles S. Maier, The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century
Western Europe, 86 AM. HIST. REV. 327, 328 (1981).
2
WTO, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2008: TRADE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 15 (WTO eds., 2008),
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report08_e.pdf.
3
INST. OF MED., NAT’L. ACAD. OF SCI., & NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, FINDING COMMON GROUND:
U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS IN A CHANGED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 61 (1991).
4
Id.
5
50 U.S.C. § 4811(3).
6
NAT’L BUREAU OF ASIAN RES., UPDATE TO THE IP COMMISSION REPORT - THE THEFT OF
AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: REASSESSMENT OF THE CHALLENGE AND UNITED STATES POLICY
3 (Natl’ Bureau of Asian Res. eds., 2017), https://www.nbr.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdfs/publications/IP_Commission_Report_Update.pdf.
7
PRC State-Owned Company, Taiwan Company, and Three Individuals Charged with Economic
Espionage, JUST. NEWS (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/prc-state-owned-companytaiwan-company-and-three-individuals-charged-economic-espionage.
8
Melissa K. Griffith & Sophie Goguichvili, The U.S. Needs a Sustained Comprehensive, and
Cohesive Semiconductor National Security Effort, THE WILSON CTR.: CTRL FORWARD. (Mar. 23,
2021), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/us-needs-sustained-comprehensive-and-cohesivesemiconductor-national-security-effort.
9
The Damaging Effects of IP Theft, BERKLEY SCH. OF INFO. (Aug. 24, 2018),
https://ischoolonline.berkeley.edu/blog/damaging-effects-ip-theft/.
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impact on the national security of the United States, whether it be from a defense
standpoint or an economic stability one.10.
Any system of export regulation by a nation must balance the policy gains
to be achieved through controls with the economic costs of their use. 11 This article
will argue that Section 736.2(b)(10) of the Export Administration Regulations
(“EAR”), known as General Prohibition Ten, fails to balance policy rationales by
creating vulnerabilities that jeopardize the national security of the United States and
adds unnecessary costs to American exporters. This regulation, which sets forth
appropriate export behavior, creates significant vulnerabilities for American
exports that are in transit and poses serious national security concerns in both the
short-and long-term for the United States.
Under General Prohibition Ten, once an exporter discovers that a violation
of the EAR has occurred,12 the transport process must be halted completely, and
products are left sitting along a supply chain route subject to theft, replication,
damage, etc. Through legislation, Congress has directed the Department of
Congress to create an export control regime that protects American innovation and
national security.13 As it stands, General Prohibition Ten does not achieve the intent
of Congress and must be reformed.
To illustrate the need for reform and the tangible security risks that General
Prohibition Ten poses to the United States, this article will holistically analyze
General Prohibition Ten from enactment to the present day. Part One of the article
will discuss the historical developments of the EAR’s authorizing statutes and
analyze Congress’ intent for America’s export control regime. Part Two will
examine the current regulatory framework of General Prohibition Ten including the
enforcement mechanisms. It will also highlight the policy rationale of the
regulation. Part Three of the article will highlight the vulnerabilities created by
General Prohibition Ten. Part Four will describe General Prohibition Ten’s
inconsistency with Congressional intent. Finally, Part Five will propose new
language for General Prohibition Ten that accomplishes the Department of
Commerce’s goals, complies with Congressional intent, and protects the national
security of the United States.

10

Cyber Espionage and the Theft of U.S. Intellectual Property and Technology: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. On Energy & Com., 113th Cong.
113-67 (2013) (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Member, H. Comm. On Energy &
Commerce); Reggie Ash, Protecting Intellectual Property and the Nation’s Economic Security,
AM. BAR ASS’N: LANDSLIDE May 2014,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/landslide/201314/may-june/protecting-intellectual-property-nations-economic-security/#33.
11
Christopher J. Donovan, The Export Administration Act of 1979: Refining United States Export
Control Machinery, 4 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 77 (1981).
12
Donovan, supra note 11, at 77.
13
50 U.S.C. § 4811(3); 50 U.S.C. § 4813.
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I.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND STATEMENTS OF POLICY:
CONGRESSIONAL POLICY GOALS AND RATIONALES FOR
AMERICAN EXPORT LAWS

When Congress deliberated the United States’ export control regime, its
main goal was to secure America’s national security and further the nation’s
interests around the world.14 General Prohibition Ten as it is currently written does
not conform to Congressional intent, as demonstrated by statements from Senators
during Congressional debate as well as the language within the legislation itself.
The section will provide a roadmap on the EAR and provide insight into how
General Prohibition Ten was created and why it was created.

A. The Export Control Act of 1949: America’s Cold War
Strategy
The Cold War was the primary motivating factor for the development of
export control regimes in the United States, just as it was for many policy decisions
in the second half of the twentieth century.15 In 1948, the United States began to
impose licensing requirements on exports to the Soviet bloc, and then in 1949,
Congress recognized the need for controls in the Export Control Act of 1949. 16 The
primary objective of the export controls authorized in the Export Control Act of
1948 was to prevent or delay improvements in Soviet and Chinese military
capabilities that could be accomplished or facilitated through the acquisition of
Western technology and end products. 17
The rationale behind preventing or delaying improvements in the military
capabilities of our adversaries was derived from an understanding that, for political
and economic reasons, it was neither possible nor even desirable for the West to
maintain numerical equality with the mobilized troop strength or weaponry of
Communist nations.18 This understanding led to the "force multiplier" strategy of
maintaining military superiority over potential adversaries. 19 The “force multiplier”
strategy is just as important in the current geopolitical landscape as it was during
14

Export Control Provisions, FAS (Oct. 12, 1998, 5:19 PM),
https://fas.org/nuke/control/export/provisions.htm#:~:text=The%20Export%20Control%20Act%2
0of,security%2C%20foreign%20policy%2C%20and%20short.
15
Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, & National Academy of Engineering,
supra note 3; Alice Friend & Joseph Kiernan, The U.S. Government in the Cold War, in BY OTHER
MEANS PART II: ADAPTING TO COMPETE IN THE GRAY ZONE 68, 68-71 (Ctr. For Strategic & Int’l
Stud. eds., 2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/case-study-us-government-cold-war.
16
Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, & National Academy of Engineering,
supra note 3.
17
Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, & National Academy of Engineering,
supra note 3.
18
Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, & National Academy of Engineering,
supra note 3.
19
Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, & National Academy of Engineering,
supra note 3.
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the Cold War. The largest military threats to the United States come from China,
Russia, and North Korea, most of which have a larger conventional force than the
United States, which reinforces the need for the United States to be technologically
superior to those nations.20 An inevitable outgrowth of this strategy, during the Cold
War, was to control exports of goods and technology that had commercial, as well
as military, applications.21 By relying on the force multiplier strategy, NATO
actively controlled “the export of militarily significant goods and technology,
including arms and so-called dual-use items, which has continued until the present
day.”22
Unlike the current EAR, the regulations authorized by the Export Control
Act of 1949 did not restrict exporters from securing exports once a violation has
been discovered or should have been discovered.23 The subsequent regulations
made it unlawful to knowingly “export, dispose of, divert, transship, or reexport”
goods in violation of any export control document or prior representation. 24

B. The Export Administration Act of 1979: A Focus on
American National Security and Embracing the “Lead
Time” Approach While Minimizing Restrictions on
American Exporters
While the Export Administration Act of 1979 is not the authorizing
legislation for the current EAR, it was the initial authorizing legislation of the EAR
and was used as a pretext to create General Prohibition Ten. 25 The Act further
illustrates General Prohibition’s inconsistency with Congressional intent as it
relates to safeguarding national security and minimizing costs on American
Exporters. Congress enacted the Export Administration Act of 1979, the successor
to the Export Control Acts of 1949 and 1969, because of a series of geopolitical
and economic events that required a change in American export regimes. 26 This Act

20

Forrest E. Morgan & Raphael S. Cohen, MILITARY TRENDS AND THE FUTURE OF WARFARE: THE
CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. AIR FORCE 11 (RAND
Corp. eds., 2020).
21
See Export Administration Regulation; Simplification of Export Administration Regulations 61
Fed. Reg. 12714 (Mar. 25, 1996).
22
Id.
23
Paul H. Silverstone, The Export Control Act of 1949: Extraterritorial Enforcement, 107 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 331, 337 (1959).
24
15 C.F.R. § 387.6 (1974).
25
The Export Administration Act of 1979, previously codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4623
(“EAA”), lapsed on August 20, 2001.The President, through Executive Order 13222 of August 17,
2001 (3 C.F.R., 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)) continued the Export Administration Regulations in
effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq.) (2012)
(“IEEPA”).
26
Extension and Revision of the Export Administration Act of 1969: Hearings and Markup before
the
Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Pol’y and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Aff.,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1969) (statement of Marshall I. Goldman, Professor of
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was also the origin of the EAR. The Act states that “it is the policy of the United
States that export trade by United States citizens be given a high priority and not be
controlled except when such controls (A) are necessary to further fundamental
national security, foreign policy, or short supply objectives, (B) will clearly further
such objectives, and (C) are administered consistent with basic standards of due
process.”27 Legislators also understood that the Act must jointly minimize
restrictions and achieve the foreign policy and national security goals of the United
States. The Act says, “[i]t is the policy of the United States to restrict the ability to
export only after full consideration of the impact on the economy of the United
States and only to the extent necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of
the United States or to fulfill its declared international obligations.” 28
Congress’ emphasis on minimizing restrictions arose as a result of a few
factors. One was that the Soviet Union was increasingly becoming one of the
world’s major economic and military powers despite the embargo, so the United
States needed to lower the cost on exporters to promote trade superiority by
minimizing restrictions.29 Trade superiority required an expansion of trade between
Eastern and Western nations and the Export Administration Act of 1979 indicated
a willingness to lower costs on American exporters by minimizing restrictions and
thus facilitating increased trade.30 The preface of the statute discloses that it is “[a]n
Act to provide authority to regulate exports, to improve the efficiency of export
regulation, and to minimize interference with the ability to engage in commerce.” 31
However, improvements to the technical and functional aspects of export licensing
and more careful considerations of the economic and balance of payments impacts
of controls, illustrated that the legislation was aimed to “free many unjustifiably
controlled commodities” without sacrificing the United States’ commitment to
preserving national security.32
A key aspect of geopolitics is that a nation cannot prevent another nation
from eventually catching up, in terms of technological ability. 33 But, it should take
action to delay another nation from stealing its technological innovations.34 This is
known as the “lead time” approach.35 The creation of the 1979 Act began with this
basic presumption that controls only serve to delay rather than prevent the
acquisition of technology.36 In theory, such a lead time will allow the United States
Economics, Wellesley College, and Associate Director, Russian Research Center, Harvard
University).
27
The Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 3, 93 Stat. 503 (1979).
28
Id.
29
Donovan, supra note 11, at 84.
30
Donovan, supra note 11, at 84.
31
The Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 3, 93 Stat. 503 (1979).
32
Donovan, supra note 11, at 84.
33
Donovan, supra note 11, at 94.
34
Donovan, supra note 11, at 94.
35
Donovan, supra note 11, at 94.
36
Department of Defense Policy Statement on Export Control of United States Technology:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Pol’y and Trade of House Comm. on Int'l Relations,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1977) (Statement of Dr. Ellen Frost of the Department of Defense:

38

2022

Santa Clara Journal of International Law
to advance technologically, so that when another nation eventually catches up to
the previous technological standard, the United States is already at a higher level of
technological superiority.37 Though a complex global information landscape makes
it almost impossible to completely prevent another nation from stealing
technological innovations from the United States, General Prohibition Ten impedes
Congress’ intent of lengthening the lead time of American technological innovation
by prohibiting exporters from securing exports, which makes it easier for a nation
to steal American technology.
Further, Congress understood the necessity of avoiding lengthy delays for
export licenses. For example, while detailing the provisions of the act, thenCongressman Bingham said that “[P]rocedural requirements for processing export
license applications, including time limits for making licensing determinations, are
established in order to reduce the long delays which frequently occur under current
practice.”38 Preventing delays is not only important from a purely financial
perspective, but also from a national security and technological competitiveness
standpoint. The longer the process takes of getting a product from exporter to
customer, the more opportunity other nations have to steal technological
information and reduce the “lead time” of the United States, jeopardizing American
technological leadership.39 General Prohibition Ten dramatically increases delivery
time, especially if during the Bureau of Industry and Security’s (“BIS”)
investigation into the export violation, the export is damaged, stolen, lost, etc.
The Export Administration Act of 1979 illustrates Congressional intent as
it relates to the export control regime of the United States, during a time where the
United States had a formidable adversary in the Soviet Union. However, it is
important to know whether the nation’s policy goals have changed since the fall of
the Soviet Union and whether General Prohibition Ten is in-line with post-Cold
War Congressional intent, especially in an era of increased competition and
confrontation with nations such as China.

C. Perpetual Emergencies and Recent Legislative Reforms
Although the Export Administration Act of 1979 expired in 1994,
Presidents Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Trump reauthorized it, using their powers

“Now our object is not, and cannot, be to delay the export of something once and for all.
Technology is a moving train and the Russians are going to get there anyway in their own way and
their own time. But our object is to delay their acquisition of certain critical technologies for
certain periods of time. We are dealing here with a marginal concept. That is what "lead time"
means.”).
37
Id.
38
98th CONG. REC. 13054-55 (daily ed. May 21, 1984) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
39
Lauren G. Paul, How to Improve Supply Chain Security (The Trick is to Keep it Moving), CSO
(Sep. 30, 2004 7:00 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/2117699/supply-chain-security-howto-improve-supply-chain-security-the-trick-is-to-keep-it-moving.html.
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under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. 40 Each President cited
a threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States
to issue their executive order declaring that an emergency existed and that the 1979
act should be reauthorized.41
Congress understood the growing challenges that a highly competitive
global trade network presented to the United States and mandated that the
Department of Commerce respond to those challenges adequately, through the
Export Control Reform Act of 2018. 42 One of the primary policy motivations
behind the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act, which contains
the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 was the need to enhance U.S. export and
investment controls to address concerns regarding the release of critical
technologies to end uses, end users, and destinations of concern primarily China;
as well as allowing American exporters to better compete against competing
regulatory frameworks of competitor nations.43 The statements of policy in the
Export Control Reform Act of 2018 represent Congress’ unambiguous intent as it
pertains to the nation’s export control regime. However, despite Congress’
authorization, the Department of Commerce has not reformed General Prohibition
Ten.
The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 gave the Department of Commerce
the required authority to address the vulnerabilities in the export control regime
such as those that General Prohibition Ten creates.44 Congress tasked the BIS with
updating U.S. export controls on emerging and foundational technologies that were
essential to the national security of the United States.45
In addition, the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 made Congress’ intent
clear as to the policy goals that any regulations the Department of Commerce going
forward enacts must accomplish. First, Congress noted that “[t]he national security
of the United States requires that the United States maintain its leadership in the
science, technology, engineering, and manufacturing sectors, including
foundational technology that is essential to innovation.”46 Further, Congress
40

IEEPA grants sweeping powers to the President to control economic transactions. Congress has
directed the President on numerous occasions to use IEEPA authorities to impose sanctions. Letter
to Congressional Leaders on Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations,
2009, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. (Aug. 13, 2009); Message to the Congress Reporting on Export
Control Regulations, 1995, WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. (Mar. 21, 1995).
41
Id. at 10.
42
The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 became law in August of 2018 as part of the John S.
McCain National Defense Authorization Act and passed with bipartisan support with a total of 87
votes in the Senate and 351 votes in the House of Representatives. H.R. 5515 Roll Call Vote,
(https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2018230); H.R. 5515 As Amended Senate Roll Call Vote,
(https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=115&ses
sion=2&vote=00128).
43
H. R. REP. 116-333, at 667 (2019) (Conf. Rep.).
44
50 U.S.C. § 4811.
45
Id.
46
50 U.S.C. § 4811(3).
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understood the need for America’s export regime to adapt to the needs of the
twenty-first century. Thus, Congress mandates that “[t]he export control system
must ensure that it is transparent, predictable, and timely, has the flexibility to be
adapted to address new threats in the future and allows seamless access to and
sharing of export control information among all relevant United States national
security and foreign policy agencies.”47 In addition to adapting to new threats,
Congress intended for the nation’s export control regime to be competitive with
those of other nations, so that exporters are able to set prices at international market
rates. Congress directed the Department of Commerce “[t]o use export controls
only after full consideration of the impact on the economy of the United States and
only to the extent necessary to restrict the export of items if necessary to further
significantly the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared
international obligations.”48

II.

CURRENT REGULATORY LANDSCAPE SURROUNDING THE
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS AND GENERAL
PROHIBITION TEN: LANGUAGE AND ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS

The United States has established a complex export control regime and
exporters have a duty to stay up to date on the regulations or be subject to large
penalties and punishments.49 Beginning with a discussion of the EAR, followed by
prohibited actions, under General Prohibition Ten, that an exporter must avoid once
a violation has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur in connection with the item,
this section will describe the current regulatory landscape surrounding the EAR and
General Prohibition Ten. This section will illustrate the rigid structure of the EAR
by walking through the scope of the regulations.

A. Export Administration Regulations: Overview of US
Export Control Regime
The Export Administration Regulations, which house General Prohibition
Ten, are administered by BIS.50 The regulations control dual-use items as well as
less-sensitive defensive articles.51 Dual-use items refer to certain items that can be
used for both civil and military purposes.52 Some examples of dual-use items are
lasers and sensors, navigation and avionics, propulsion systems and space vehicles,
telecommunications and information security, etc. 53 The EAR’s Commerce Control
List (“CCL”) provides a list of goods, software, and technology with varying levels
47

50 U.S.C. § 4811(8).
50 U.S.C. § 4811(1).
49
15 C.F.R. § 732.1(c).
50
15 C.F.R. § 764.1; Ian F. Fergusson, The Export Administration Act: Evolution, Provisions, and
Debate 1 Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL31832, (2009); 50 U.S.C. § 4801(4).
51
15 C.F.R. § 730.3.
52
Id.
53
15 C.F.R. pt. 774.
48
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of controls, which are based upon a variety of national security and foreign policy
reasons as well as the product’s country of destination.54
i.

Scope of EAR and Items Subject to Regulation

The EAR applies to items, that are located within the United States, such as
items shipped within the United States or items shipped from abroad that are
currently located on U.S. soil; items that originated in the United States; foreignproduced items that contain more than a de minimis amount of controlled US-origin
content;55 and certain foreign-made products that are the direct product of specified
American technology and software, such as a computer or phone that contains
specified software.56 The EAR also applies to re-exports, which is when an item is
sent from one foreign country to another foreign country, as well as transfers, which
is when an item is moved around within the United States.57 It is the exporter’s
responsibility to determine whether the item/software they are exporting falls
within the EAR through the CCL list.58 The CCL contains a list of items used by
BIS to identify more sensitive dual-use or civil items, as well as some less sensitive
defense articles not falling under the ITAR.59
ii.

Violations of the EAR

Section 764.2 of the EAR specifies conduct that constitutes a violation of
the EAR and defines the sanctions that may be imposed for such violations.60
Section 764 describes the administrative sanctions that may be imposed by BIS and
the criminal sanctions that may be imposed by a United States court. 61 The
following is a list of actions that constitute a violation: engaging in prohibited
conduct, such as exporting a controlled item to embargoed nations like Cuba, Iran,
and Syria62 or exporting a controlled item to an unauthorized end-user 63; causing,
aiding, or abetting a violation; solicitation and/or attempting of a violation;
conspiracy; acting with knowledge of a violation; misrepresentation and
concealment of facts; evasion; failure to comply with reporting or, recordkeeping
requirements; license alteration; and acting contrary to the terms of a denial order. 64

54

15 C.F.R. § 738.1.
15 C.F.R. § 734.4.
56
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B. General Prohibition Ten: Full-Stop on the Export
Process
The EAR has been amended over the years with an eye towards
simplification, although those efforts have failed.65 The General Prohibitions,
including General Prohibition Ten, were created when the Department of
Commerce revised the EAR in 1996.66 In 1996, the Secretary of Commerce
submitted a report to Congress declaring that the Bureau of Export Administration
would undertake a comprehensive review of the EAR to “simplify, clarify, and
make the regulations more user friendly.” 67 The Bureau of Export Administration
developed a proposed rule, containing General Prohibition Ten, for seven months
and streamlined the rules for when an export or reexport would require a license by
creating ten general prohibitions.68
Compared to the list of prohibited actions under the Export Control Act of
1949, General Prohibition Ten, which does not allow an exporter to sell, transfer,
export, reexport, finance, order, buy, remove, conceal, store, use, loan, dispose of,
transport, forward, or otherwise service its products; the restrictions, is more
stringent. There is no available evidence that the list of prohibited actions under the
Export Control Act of 1949 was underinclusive and led bad faith exporters to take
advantage of the legislation as it is written. In fact, several commenters to the
proposed rule, during the notice and comment phase, expressed a similar concern. 69
The commenters stated that the proposed rule continued to present a complex set
of requirements, and many commenters suggested fundamental decontrols and
elimination of longstanding regulatory requirements. 70 In response, BIS argued that
they did not have the capacity to make fundamental changes to the policy set forth
by the Congress.71 As mentioned previously, Congress intended for controls to
protect American leadership in innovation and for such controls to take into account
its impact on the American economy and exporters. To achieve such an end,
Congress gave the Department of Commerce the authority to develop controls. BIS
65

15 C.F.R. pt. 768 et al (1994); 15 C.F.R. pt. 740 et al (1996); 15 C.F.R. pt. 736 et al; 15 C.F.R.
pt. 732 et al; 15 C.F.R. pt. 734 et al; Notice of Proposed Revision and Simplification of export
administration regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 28 (Feb. 10, 1994); Export Administration Regulation;
Simplification of Export Administration Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 12714 (Mar. 25, 1996);
Conforming Changes to Certain End-User/End-Use Based Controls in the EAR: Clarification of
the Term “Transfer” and Related Terms as Used in the EAR, 73 Fed. Reg. 68321-68328 (Nov. 18,
2008); Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Export Control Classification
Number 0Y521 Series, Items Not Elsewhere Listed on the Commerce Control List (CCL), 77 Fed.
Reg. 22191 (Apr. 13, 2012).
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Export Administration Regulation; Simplification of Export Administration Regulations, 61
Fed. Reg. 12714 (Mar. 25, 1996).
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Export Administration Regulation; Simplification of Export Administration Regulations, 60
Fed. Reg. 91 (proposed May 11, 1995).
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Fed. Reg. 12714, 12719 (Mar. 25, 1996).
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is correct in noting that it does not have the capacity to make fundamental changes
to the policy set forth by Congress, however BIS does not need to change
Congressional policies, but instead needs to comply with existing Congressional
policies.72
The specific language of General Prohibition Ten has not changed in almost
thirty years. Under General Prohibition Ten, exporters must halt all activity
associated with the item once a violation has been discovered by the exporter or
BIS.73 Section 736.2(b)(10) states that:
Proceeding with transactions with knowledge that a violation has occurred or is
about to occur (Knowledge Violation to Occur). You may not sell, transfer,
export, reexport, finance, order, buy, remove, conceal, store, use, loan, dispose
of, transport, forward, or otherwise service, in whole or in part, any item
subject to the EAR and exported or to be exported with knowledge that a violation
of the Export Administration Regulations, the Export Administration Act or any
order, license, License Exception, or other authorization issued thereunder has
occurred, is about to occur, or is intended to occur in connection with the item. Nor
may you rely upon any license or License Exception after notice to you of the
suspension or revocation of that license or exception. There are no License
Exceptions to this General Prohibition Ten in part 740 of the EAR. 74
As is evident from the regulatory language, once a violation has been
discovered or is imminent, an exporter is almost powerless to take control of the
export and secure it pending an investigation or BIS approval.
i.

General Prohibition Ten Knowledge Requirement

Since General Prohibition Ten explicitly creates a scienter requirement, a
simple violation by the exporter is not enough to trigger an export freeze. The
exporter must have knowledge that a violation has occurred, is about to occur, or is
intended to occur in connection with an item.75 In practice, there are effectively two
standards for punishing violators of General Prohibition Ten: A standard when
pursuing criminal charges, and a standard for civil penalties. When pursuing
criminal charges, the National Security Division of the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) employs a willfulness standard to determine whether an exporter should
have known whether a violation occurred. 76 In pursuing such charges, the DOJ
employs the definition of willful from Bryan v. United States, which held that an
act is willful if done with the knowledge that it is illegal. 77 For civil cases under the
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EAR there is typically no willful intent required to prove a violation. 78 Parties can
be found liable for actions based on fraud, gross negligence, and negligence. 79
ii.

Punishments for Violating General Prohibition
Ten

Section 764.3 of the EAR sets out the penalties that exporters can face for
violating General Prohibition Ten, both administrative and criminal. 80 The Export
Control Reform Act (ECRA) sets forth the administrative penalties to be used in
the EAR. Civil penalties can include up to $300,000 or twice the value of the
transaction for each violation, whichever is greater.81 Further, BIS has the authority
to revoke the license it issued to the exporter and restrict the exporter’s ability to
export, re-export, or transfer any items subject to the EAR. 82 Criminal penalties can
include a fine of up to $1,000,000 per violation for a company and up to $1,000,000
or imprisonment for up to twenty years, or both, for an individual. 83
BIS strongly encourages exporters to self-report violations through a
process known as voluntary self-disclosure by providing a fifty percent reduction
in the base penalty amount, in most cases, with the possibility of full penalty
suspensions for cooperating exporters. 84
iii.

Rationale for General Prohibition Ten

By mandating that exporters pause their exporting activity as a result of a
violation of the EAR, the Department of Commerce is aiming to prevent bad-faith
actors from getting rid of an export that caused a violation before an investigation
can be completed.85 Using a crime scene analogy, General Prohibition Ten aims to
preserve the crime scene and allows BIS to obtain all the necessary evidence to
make a case for an EAR violation. Furthermore, the current language aims to
prevent bad-faith exporters from completing the export process, which makes it
increasingly difficult for BIS to seize the export or the funds from the sale.86
Essentially, BIS aims to avoid turning a simple violation into a larger issue that
involves more parties or actors, which makes an investigation more complicated.
78

Under the BIS and OFAC Enforcement Guidelines, “Awareness of Conduct at Issue” is a factor
to be considered by the agency in assessing penalties, i.e., if a respondent had knowledge or reason
to know that the conduct constituted a violation, this would justify a higher penalty amount. See
Guidance on Charging and Penalty Determinations in Settlement of Administrative Enforcement
Cases, 15 C.F.R. pt. 766, Supp. 1, Sec. III (2016).
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19 U.S.C. § 1592 (2020).
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15 C.F.R. § 764.3 (2020).
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50 U.S.C. § 4819(c)(1)(A) (2020).
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50 U.S.C. §§ 4819(c)(1)(B)–(C) (2020).
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22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (2014).
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15 C.F.R. pt. 766, Supp. 1 (2016).
85
See 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(10). The use of the terms “dispose of” illustrate the Bureau’s desire for
the export to not be discarded of, which would further complicate the investigation.
86
Id. The use of terms “export,” “re-export,” “sell,” etc. illustrate the Bureau’s desire to prevent
the completion of the export process while an investigation is being conducted.
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The BIS’ rationale is not unjustified, but General Prohibition Ten can and must
accomplish the goals of BIS without jeopardizing our national security and foreign
policy goals.

III.

VULNERABILITIES CREATED BY GENERAL PROHIBITION TEN:
FROM THEORETICAL TO DISASTROUS
A. Mistakenly Shipped Goods: Unauthorized and
Unanticipated End-Users

It is a violation of the EAR to export a product to an unauthorized enduser. Doing so triggers General Prohibition Ten’s provisions and freezes the
export in place. There are times where exporters intentionally and in bad faith
export items or data to unauthorized end-users and the BIS investigates and
penalizes such exporters.88 However, there are other times where an exporter
mistakenly exports an item to an unauthorized end-user, which still triggers the
export freeze under General Prohibition Ten.89 In this case, the exporter can either
self-disclose its violation or the end-user may report the violation to the BIS. 90
Either way, the exporter essentially cannot take control of the export while the BIS
investigates the violation.91
87

The inability to take control of an export leaves the exporter at the mercy of
the unauthorized end-user to secure the item and not let the product be stolen,
replicated, damaged, etc. while the investigation is completed. 92 Other nations may
take advantage of this vulnerability by coercing the unauthorized end-user into
turning over the export to that nation’s control or by allowing that nation to replicate
the export before sending it back to the American exporter. 93 To this end, the United
States understands that unauthorized end-users, in certain nations, are vulnerable to
the pressures of other nations.94 For example, the United States took action to secure
87
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HUAWEI, (BNA 2020), https://www.arnoldporter.com//media/files/perspectives/publications/2020/06/restrictionsonsalestohuawei.pdf?.
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Fergus Hanson, Emilia Currey & Tracy Beattie, The Chinese Communist Party’s Coercive
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21, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/03/the-us-and-china-finally-get-real88
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Lockheed Martin’s F-35 technology in 2019 when the Republic of Turkey
contracted with Russia to buy Russian surface-to-air missiles.95 While the majority
of defense exports are under the authority of the ITAR rather than the authority of
the EAR, certain components of military aircraft fall under the jurisdiction of the
EAR because they are considered dual-use items. 96 The United States was worried
that Russia would coerce Turkey to hand over technology related to the F-35, which
poses a direct national security threat to the United States.97 The Department of
Defense said it was “taking prudent steps to protect the shared investments made in
our critical technology.”98
The inability to confidently rely on the end-user to act in good-faith or be
free from the coercive nature of other nations, highlights the need for American
exporters to secure an item pending an investigation. While there may be financial
incentives for the unauthorized end-user to act in good faith, such as if the end-user
has a business relationship with the exporter, the real vulnerability is when the
export is mistakenly sent to an unauthorized end-user that has no connection to the
exporter and thus no incentive to act in good faith.

B. Stolen or Replicated Technology: Export Freeze and the
Port Vulnerability
In addition to the vulnerability of mistakenly shipped goods being subject
to the good faith of unauthorized end-users, General Prohibition Ten also creates a
vulnerability that American exports will be tampered with during transit along the
supply chain when the export freeze takes effect. According to the National Cargo
Security Council, lost or stolen cargo is estimated to cost $50 billion annually.99
That number incorporates mislaid and mislabeled cargo losses as well as losses
involving criminal behavior such as breaking into ports to steal goods. 100 Globally,
eighteen percent of all cargo theft consists of theft from a facility, second only to

with-each-other/618345/; Joseph Choi, Blinken Warns of US Pushback to Any Chinese ‘Coercion
and Aggression’, THE HILL (Mar. 16, 2021, 7:30 AM),
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See 22 C.F.R. §121.1 n. 3 to paragraph (F).
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Congress to delay the transfer of F-35 equipment to Turkey to help ensure U.S. military
technology and capabilities cannot fall into the hands of the Kremlin,” – Senator Shaheen).
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Eva Grey, Cargo Theft: A Billion-Dollar Problem, SHIP TECHNOLOGY (Feb. 4, 2020, 7:30 AM),
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hijackings.101 Following the events of September 11th, the United States required
federal agencies, ports, and vessel owners to take numerous steps to upgrade
security.102 Exporters prefer constant movement of product along the supply chain
and into the authorized user’s possession, as this allows the security risk of theft to
be reduced.103 However, General Prohibition Ten’s export freeze forces an exporter
to pause the export of a product whenever required, regardless of where it is along
the supply chain, which increases the chances that the product will be stolen or
damaged. The American exporter is unable to secure the item and is at the mercy
of the warehouse or port, where the export has been halted, to secure the product
and avoid theft. While ports across the world have increased security to avoid theft,
the regulation still presents a vulnerability that an American export could be stolen
as those with the intent of stealing the product are aware that during a freeze the
export is at its most vulnerable.104

C. From Theoretical to Empirical: Real-World Examples of
General Prohibition Ten’s Vulnerabilities
The inability to take control of an export, whether it be a tangible or
intangible good, has made it difficult for American exporters to secure their export,
comply with the EAR, and compete with foreign exporters. This section will
illustrate how the vulnerabilities mentioned previously have been felt by American
exporters.
i.

Installed Bases in Libya: Inability to Take Control

In 2004, BIS announced its intention to amend the EAR to implement the
President’s decision to modify the United States’ sanctions against Libya, in
response to Libya’s continuing efforts to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction
and missile programs, and its renunciation of terrorism.105 Two respondents to the
notice of proposed rulemaking requested relief from General Prohibition Ten
because the “application of this broad prohibition to U.S.-origin items already in
Libya has already created considerable confusion among U.S. exporters and
contractors, particularly those who may be requested to repair, upgrade or otherwise
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deal with these items or the systems in which they are incorporated.” 106 Essentially,
the embargo made it a violation to service installed base items in Libya, which are
the exporter’s U.S.-origin items currently in use. 107 A commenter reported that
“[o]ver the period of the embargo, it is inevitable that Libyan end-users acquired
U.S.-origin equipment, systems, parts, or software from resellers around the world”
and this would be a violation of General Prohibition Ten because at the time of the
embargo the end-users were not authorized to have the installed base items. 108 Some
of these end-users may not have even been aware of the U.S. jurisdiction of the
items they acquired, such as U.S.-origin software in computer systems produced
outside the United States and carrying non-U.S. brand names. In other instances,
end-users may have incorrectly assumed that non-U.S. equipment resellers had
complied with the U.S. de minimis rules.”109 The inability to take repair, upgrade,
or otherwise deal with the item put American exporters at a competitive
disadvantage, compared to foreign exporters in Libya, by allowing foreign
exporters access to the IP of the American exporter unable to service its product
and had “the potential to paralyze a significant portion of U.S. export trade and
commerce with Libya.”110 In response, BIS was unwilling to grant general amnesty,
in relation to General Prohibition Ten, but did allow the commenters to repair the
items once the embargo was lifted.111 This example also highlights an inconsistency
with BIS’ position on General Prohibition reform. In 1996, BIS argued that it did
not have the authority to change its policy on General Prohibition Ten, but in 2004,
BIS was simply unwilling to grant general amnesty, which implies that BIS
recognizes its authority to revise General Prohibition Ten. 112 A one-time solution
is not effective or efficient in the long-term and BIS must reform General
Prohibition Ten to prevent this from happening again.
ii.

Foreign Servers and General Prohibition Ten:
Access Issues

As mentioned previously, BIS controls the export of dual-use and less
sensitive military items through the EAR.113 In 2018, BIS sought public comment
on criteria for identifying emerging technologies essential to U.S. national security
to help inform the interagency process to identify and describe such emerging
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technologies.114 One commenter highlighted the issues that the creation of new
controls on previously uncontrolled technologies would create for American
exporters because of the prohibited actions under General Prohibition Ten.115
According to the commenter, “the creation of new controls on previously
uncontrolled technologies could effectively result in immediate violations with
respect to such technology located outside the United States, such as that stored on
servers outside the U.S. that are accessed regularly by foreign persons. 116
Furthermore, the ability of such exporters to compete economically decreases, “as
companies need to shut down access to previously open servers in order to create
new control programs, determine how many violations occurred merely as a result
of the change in control status of the technology.” 117 The identification of even one
violation as a result of the change in control status triggers General Prohibition Ten,
which then forbids the tech company from conducting the range of actions specified
in the prohibition, including implementing new controls. 118 In the best case
scenario, an inability to take control of the technology forces the exporter to
sacrifice research and economic competitiveness. In the worst-case scenario,
General Prohibition Ten leaves the technology vulnerable to foreign interference.
To prevent this, the Department of Commerce needs to reform General Prohibition
Ten.
iii.

Inability to Secure Exports: At the Mercy of the
End-User

In May 2020, BIS announced changes to a rule that imposes restrictions on
transfers, equipment, or software to Huawei Technologies Company, Ltd. 119 The
rule amended General Prohibition Three, by imposing new control over certain
foreign-produced items, when there is knowledge that such items are destined to a
designated entity on the entity list.120 U.S. exporters would be in compliance risk if
the exporter provides the covered U.S. origin software or technology to a nonHuawei entity with knowledge or reason to know that the recipient will sell such
technology to Huawei.121 General Prohibition Three makes it a violation for the
technology to end up in Huawei’s possession. 122 However, General Prohibition Ten
114
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makes it impossible to close access to the software or technology if the exporter
determines that the non-Huawei entity will sell the item to Huawei because at that
point General Prohibition Ten’s export freeze would have already taken effect. 123
The U.S. exporter could seek assurances from foreign manufacturers that the
foreign manufacturer would not sell covered products to Huawei listed entities, but
that would still leave the U.S. exporter at the mercy of that manufacturer to uphold
such an assurance.

IV.

THREE STRIKES: GENERAL PROHIBITION TEN IS
INCONSISTENT WITH THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF CONGRESS

The intent of Congress in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 was threefold: first, the United States should maintain its leadership in innovation; second,
the United States should adapt to address new threats in the future; and third, the
United States should accomplish its foreign policy goals while considering the
impact on the economy of the United States. This section will explain how General
Prohibition Ten does not accomplish any of the three goals that Congress instructed
the Department of Commerce to comply with. To borrow a line from baseball, it is
three strikes and you are out for General Prohibition Ten.

A. First Strike: A Threat to American Leadership in
Innovation
In 1960, the United States was the global leader in research and
development, accounting for 69 percent of the world’s research and
development.124 Today, other nations have increased their aspirations to be the
global leader in innovation, and the United States’ share of the world’s research
and development has been cut to 30 percent. 125 Thus, the United States’ leadership
in innovation is under threat. 126 President Biden, during his presidential campaign
and during the beginning days of his presidency, saw the increased competition
regarding research and development as one between democracy and autocracy. 127
A renewed commitment towards competition between the United States and other
nations is multi-faceted and encompasses areas such as trade law, foreign policy,
human rights law, IT and cyber regulations, the emerging cryptocurrency
regulatory world, etc. Export controls are a large aspect of any competition
campaign against nations such as China, and an important first step is identifying
and correcting the vulnerabilities that exist within the current export control regime.
123
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General Prohibition Ten threatens American leadership in innovation by creating
vulnerabilities in the supply chain for bad-faith actors to steal, replicate, or
otherwise tamper with American exports.
In Section I, the “lead time” approach was identified and defined. While the
lead time approach has its origins in the Cold War, where the two superpowers were
attempting to gain the edge in innovation and technology, it is still relevant and
applicable today in a competitive environment with China. 128 The United States
must ensure that dated regulations do not prevent American exporters from
protecting their innovations. Nations like China publicly subscribe to aspirations of
replacing the United States as the leader in science, technology, engineering, and
manufacturing; and have attempted to steal such technology or information from
the United States.129 The National Intelligence Council, in a report on Global
Trends for the next twenty years, predicts that “strengthened economic
interdependence lowers the risk of the major powers pursuing armed conflicts; most
of them engage in influence operations, corporate, espionage, and cyber-attacks
that allow them to achieve goals without risking destructive wars. 130 Other nations
will continue to find vulnerabilities to exploit American laws and regulations to
gain an edge on the United States, and these moves threaten U.S. leadership in
innovation and technology.
General Prohibition Ten negatively impacts the United States’ ability to
compete with other nations and jeopardizes the nation’s leadership in innovation
because it presents the opportunity for bad-faith actors to steal or replicate
technology during export freezes. To reiterate, General Prohibition Ten prevents
exporters from taking control of a product while an investigation into the EAR
violation ensues. As noted earlier, a simple mis-shipment constitutes a violation
under the EAR and leaves American exporters at the mercy of the incorrect enduser to send the item back without tampering with it or stealing valuable IP. If the
end-user operates in bad faith, then the IP could be lost to other nations, which
could replicate or steal the technology, hampering the United States’ advantage in
innovation. Essential IP valuable to the United States could end up in the hands of
unauthorized parties, who instead of returning the export back to the American
exporter could, theoretically, sell it to the highest bidder. That would significantly
reduce American “lead-time” for certain products.
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B. Second Strike: Inability to Address New Threats and a
New System of Exports
As mentioned before, General Prohibition Ten was created during the
Clinton Administration’s attempt to streamline the EAR. 131 The internet had yet to
be widely commercialized,132 and trade differed widely from the system of trade
that exists today.133 During the 1990s, the ability of foreign nations to intercept
exports and steal valuable IP was limited to physically coming into contact with the
product. The risk of this happening was fairly limited because the risk of being
caught during this attempt would be high. However, trade has expanded from
physical products to items such as software and IP theft has “been made easier and
more anonymous” by modern technology.134 The ease at which IP can be stolen
using modern technology, also means it has increasingly become harder for U.S.
tech exporters to protect it. Such an endeavor is made even harder or in some cases
futile when General Prohibition Ten forbids the exporter from securing the software
after knowing a violation has occurred or may occur. While trade now encompasses
twenty-first-century technology like software, American regulations, specifically
General Prohibition Ten have yet to catch up. Just as General Prohibition Ten
makes it difficult for exporters to secure physical products, it also makes it almost
impossible to secure non-tangible exports such as software and programs. In the
case of an export being sent to an unauthorized end-user applies especially to
intangible exports, American exporters will again have to rely on the unauthorized
end-user to send the software back to the exporter without replicating or tampering
with it. Relying on unauthorized end-users to act in good-faith, presents a glaring
vulnerability that other nations will exploit to get American software either by
paying the unauthorized user for the export or by recognizing that the export is at
its most vulnerable from a security standpoint during an export freeze and
proceeding to tamper with it. Uncontested is the fact that U.S. tech exporters will
always face the threat of IP theft, and many exporters have created robust
procedures to take action once a threat has been identified. However, when General
Prohibition Ten is triggered, the exporter is unable to deploy such measures to
secure their IP.
Not only does General Prohibition Ten not adapt to new categories of
exports, it also does not adapt to the new non-tangible threats that have arisen. In
many cases, nation-states sponsor cyber-attacks in an attempt to steal software from
other nations.135 Software companies send products to customers through a series
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of servers located in different nations to ensure the product remains operational
when it reaches the end-user.136 While many companies ensure that their servers
are secure despite the destination, as soon as software leaves the United States, the
threat of a cyber-attack or state-sponsored coercion to steal the software increases.
U.S. servers are subject to domestic laws and regulations that prevent the
government from accessing such servers without proper process. 137 Such statutes
and regulations create more secure servers in the United States, however foreign
servers may not always be subject to such protective regulations, which can lead to
vulnerabilities.138 The vulnerability is only compounded because of General
Prohibition Ten. In the example of the software company above, a violation of the
EAR triggers General Prohibition Ten, which mandates that the software company
halt the export of the software pending an investigation. Once triggered, the
exporter can no longer take measures to secure the software. The inability to secure
software while an investigation is pending is a vulnerability for tech companies that
may lead to theft or tampering.

C. Third Strike: A Failure to Accomplish Foreign Policy
Goals and A Failure to Consider the Economic Impact
Stolen IP from China alone costs American companies between $225 billion
and $600 billion every year.139 While the vast majority of the stolen IP is not a result
of General Prohibition Ten, the regulation imposes significant costs on American
exporters without accomplishing the foreign policy goals of the United States. The
Biden Administration has made competition with China a large aspect of the
foreign policy of the United States, which necessitates that American exporters
need to trade at a competitive advantage.140 General Prohibition Ten, as it is
currently written, does not accomplish this goal. The regulation increases the costs
on American exporters because it forces exporters to leave their IP unsecured while
an investigation takes place, which leaves such property subject to theft. Stolen and
subsequently replicated technology leaves American companies holding the bag for
research and development costs, while the replicated technology is able to trade at
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a far lower cost.141 This substantially reduces the competitive advantage of
American exporters.
Congress has been explicit in its authorizing legislation over the EAR that
its intent is to ensure that the export control regime of the United States would better
the national security of the United States by maintaining American leadership in
innovation, helping the U.S. adapt to new threats, and maintain American exporters
competitiveness by not imposing large unnecessary costs. General Prohibition Ten,
as it is currently written accomplishes none of Congress’ goals set forth in the
Export Control Reform Act of 2018.

V.

ADAPTING GENERAL PROHIBITION TEN TO THE REALITIES OF
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: RETAINING EFFECTIVE
CONTROL

As mentioned previously, the Department of Commerce has the authority
to change General Prohibition Ten. Congress was explicit as to its policy goals for
the EAR; and General Prohibition Ten does not achieve the policy goals set forth.
However, as mentioned in Part II, the underlying policy rationales, such as
preventing bad-faith exporters from violating export controls, that serve as the
foundation for General Prohibition Ten are important and new regulatory language
should accomplish those as well.
This section presents a new approach to General Prohibition Ten that would
prevent bad-faith exporters from taking advantage of the regulation, while also
protecting American leadership in innovation and upholding American national
security by allowing exporters to secure their exports while BIS conducts its
investigation into the exporters’ EAR violation.
The Department of Commerce should refine the list of prohibited actions to
be less restrictive on the exporter, which would allow the exporter to secure the
item. Further the Department of Commerce should incorporate §772.1(a) into
General Prohibition Ten, which would allow the exporter to take effective control
of the export. The proposed language is as follows:
Proceeding with transactions with knowledge that a violation has occurred or is
about to occur (Knowledge Violation to Occur). You may not sell, export,
reexport, finance, order, buy, remove, conceal, loan, dispose of, or otherwise
service, in whole or in part, any item subject to the EAR and exported or to be
exported with knowledge that a violation of the Export Administration Regulations,
the Export Administration Act or any order, license, License Exception, or other
authorization issued thereunder has occurred, is about to occur, or is intended to
occur in connection with the item. Nor may you rely upon any license or License
Exception after notice to you of the suspension or revocation of that license or
141
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exception. You may transfer, remove, store, use, transport, forward the item,
in order to retain effective control of an item, pending an investigation into the
violation. There are no License Exceptions to this General Prohibition Ten in part
740 of the EAR.
“Effective Control” is defined in §772.1(a) of the EAR in the following
way: “You maintain effective control over an item when you either retain physical
possession of the item, or secure the item in such an environment as a hotel safe, a
bonded warehouse, or a locked or guarded exhibition facility.”142 Retention of
effective control over an item is a condition of certain temporary exports and reexports.143 Temporary exports and re-exports apply to products that are only
exported to another nation for a short amount of time such as during an exhibition,
assembly, etc.144 It is clear that the purpose of §772.1(a) is to ensure security of an
export, which is the reason that placing it in General Prohibition Ten provides great
utility, as long as the Commerce Department includes software in the definition of
“effective control.”
The proposal is in line with the policy rationales of General Prohibition Ten
when it was originally written. First, the proposal does not allow a bad-faith
exporter from completing the export process and thus making a BIS investigation
harder if not impossible. The bad-faith exporter will not be able to get rid of the
product before an investigation because the proposal keeps “dispose of” in the
prohibited list of actions.
In addition to achieving the policy goals of the Department of Commerce,
this proposal also brings General Prohibition Ten into line with the intent of
Congress in the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. In terms of American
leadership in innovation, this proposal helps to maintain the “lead time” in
technology of the United States by getting rid of the vulnerability that the regulation
presented. It allows the exporter to secure the export and prevent other actors from
stealing, replicating, or damaging the item. Further, the proposal adapts to the new
threats that the twenty-first century presents. This proposal allows exporters of nontangible exports to secure the item by storing the software or forwarding the item
to a more secure server, but only to gain effective control of the item. Finally, the
proposal takes into account the economic costs of such a regulation, while
accomplishing the foreign policy goals of the United States. The proposal
understands the costs that exporters have spent to develop their IP by allowing the
exporter to secure the item while the investigation is pending.
Overall, this preserves the “crime scene” so that BIS investigators can
conduct their investigation properly and accurately. The proposal also allows
exporters to secure their export in the interim while the investigation takes place,
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which is economically advantageous for the exporter but also advantageous for the
national security and foreign policy goals of the United States.

CONCLUSION
The upcoming decades will be marked by strong competition between the
United States and other emerging powers such as China. The nature of trade has
evolved greatly from the end of World War II and the Cold War; and will continue
to evolve as new technologies and exports become more common. Just as the nature
of trade continues to evolve so must American regulations. General Prohibition Ten
creates glaring vulnerabilities that can jeopardize American leadership in
innovation and thus curtail American national security and foreign policy. General
Prohibition Ten should be able to prevent bad-faith exporters from getting rid of
evidence pertaining to an EAR violation, while also allowing exporters to secure
items, during the BIS’ investigation, to protect the exports from theft, replication,
or damage. The proposal outlined above allows for both goals to be accomplished
simultaneously. In doing so, the proposal secures the vulnerabilities that the current
iteration of General Prohibition Ten creates and thus, protects America’s leadership
in innovation. While America’s leadership in innovation is multi-faceted and
reforming General Prohibition Ten is not a sufficient condition in maintaining such
leadership, it is a necessary aspect of an effort to maintain it. In a century that will
be marked by competition between democratic and autocratic governments, the
United States should reform its regulatory environment to give American exporters
the ability to secure its IP and such an effort must begin with the Department of
Commerce reforming General Prohibition Ten.
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